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course, if A. is interested in the fulfilment of the promise by B., or is
in any way benefited by its performance, that would prove a sufficient consideration for his promise ; of which
&otson v. Pegg, 6 H. & N. 295 (1861);
is a well known instance. See also
.adTalman v. Brester, 65 Barb. 369.
wdl v. Shadwell, 9 C. B. N. S. 159
(1860), is rather closer. There the defendant wrote to the plaintiff, who was
engaged to the defendant's niece, that he
was glad to hear ofhis intended marriage,

and that he would pay him 1501. a year
for life. The plaintiff subsequently married, and the contract was held binding,
although it did not appear that the
plaintiff had by reasdn of the promise
incurred any more liabilities than he was
previously under to the defendant's niece.
BYLxs, J., however, dissented in a
very able judgment. And see Davenport v. 1R-rst Cong. Sbciety, 33 Wis. 387.
But we are drifting away from our starting point.
EDXUND H. BwNsurur.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

United R~ates Circuit Court, Western Ijistrict of Penneylvania.
TAYLOR

ET AL.

v. ROCKEFELLER XT

AL.

A petition for the removal of a suit in equity to the United States Circuit Court,
with accompanying bond, was filed ir a state court during a term in which the
bill was filed, but subsequently to the filing of the answer and the appointment by
the latter court of a receiver. Held, that the petition was filed in time under the
Act of Congress of 3d March 1875, requiring the filing to be 'made "before or at
-the term at which the cause could be first tried, and before the trial thereof."
No order or allowance of the state court for a removal of the cause is necessary under the Act of 3d March 1875. Under that Act, upon the filing of a proper
petition and bond, in due season, the suit is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the
state court, provided the petition and record exhibit a case properly removable.
The jurisdiction of the state court is not ousted unless the petition and record
show a case of which the United States court has jurisdiction; but the judgment
of the state court to that effect is not binding upon the United States court; and
if the latter court holds thht the cause has been properly removed, a contrary
decision by the state court has no effect.
Any cause which might have been commenced in the Circuit Court, either
because of its subject-matter or the citizenship of the parties, may be removed
from a state court into the federal one.
Qutrre, whether the federal courts have jurisdiction of a cause in which some of
-the indispensable parties on either side are citizens of the same state as that of
some, but not all, of the indispensable parties on the other side.
They have not, "if the rule of construction applied to the Judiciary Act of
1789, and the Acts of 1866 and 1867, is applicable to the later Act of 3d March
1875. But the later act, for the first time, adopts the language of the constitution,
and seems to have been intended to confer on the Circuit Court all the jurisdiction
which, under the constitution, it was in the power of Congress to confer." Per
STRONG, J.

Seemble, that, upon a legitimate construction of the constitution, the federal jurisdiction in such a case exist,.
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Semble, that, prior to the Act of 3d March 1875, no removal could be had unless
each of the plaintiffs could have sued each of the defendants in the federal court;
though the ruling did not apply except as to indispensable parties, and perhaps not
where distinct interests were represented by distinct parties, of whom some could
sue, or were liable to be sued, in the federal courts.
But under that act the power of removal is enlarged, and may be enjoyed where
in a suit there are several controversies of which one is wholly between citizens of
different states, and can be fully determined as between them. And this is true
though others of the same party with the petitioners for removal, actually interested in other controversies embraced in the same suit, could not, on account of
having the same citizenship with some of the other party, have themselves removed
the suit.
Upon the question of citizenship under the act, the court looks to the citizenship
of the trustee, not of the cestui que trust.
Where the plaintiffs, who were all citizens of a different state from that of the
defendants, trustees, in a suit against the latter, joined their cestuis que trustent as
co-defendants, the jurisdiction of the United States court is not affected by the
citizenship of any of the cestuis qua trustent
Semble, that the "controversy" mentioned in the Act of 3d March 1875, between
the petitioners and the opposite party, need not
be the main controversy in the
case.
A controversy wholly between citizens of different states, fully determinable as
between them, entitles either of such parties to removal, though not fully determinable as between the remaining parties.
The Circuit Court, upon such removal, obtains jurisdiction over the whole cause,
the remaining controveisies therein being treated as incidental to that which authorized the removal.

to remand case to state court.
A bill in equity was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler county, Pennsylvania, on February 8th 1878, by H. L. Taylor,
John Pitcairn, Jr., and John Satterfield, against William J. Warden, Charles Lockart, William Frew, The Atlantic Refining Co.,
Charles Pratt, Henry P. Rogers, H. A. Pratt, John D. Rockefeller, and Henry M. Flagler, alleging that the plaintiffs, with one
Vandegrift and one Foreman, sold an undivided interest in their
oil-producing properties to, and entered into a partnership with, the
defendants (without mentioning their names); that the object of
the partnership was the purchase and operation of oil-producing
territory, and the production and sale of petroleum in its crude
state. It further alleged that at the time of entering into the
partnership, a written contract (which was made part of the bill)
was executed between certain trustees, named Taylor and Bushnell,
of the first part, the plaintiffs, and Foreman and Vandegrift, of the
second part, and the defendants, Flagler and Rockefeller, of the
third part, stating the terms under which the title -to the lands
MOTION
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should be purchased, held and disposed of; and fixing a method of
dissolving, and limitation to, the partnership. It further alleged,
that the defendants other than Rockefeller and Flagler, were parties to a conveyance of land to the trustees named in the foregoing
contract; that they had assented to it in writing, and declared that
their conveyance was made for the purposes set forth in it.
The contract itself showed the parties to it to be Taylor and
Bushnell, trustees, parties of the first part, who were to hold the
laids conveyed to them, to operate, control and sell them for the
sole and exclusive benefit of Taylor, Yandegrift, Piteairn, Foreman and Satterfield, parties of the second part, and Rockefeller
and Flagler, of the third part. It stipulated that in case profits
were divided, they, together with all proceeds of" sale, should be
divided monthly, or oftener if the executive committee should so
decide, and paid one-half to Taylor, for the parties of the second
part and the othei half to Flagler, for the parties of the third
part. None of the defendants, other than Rockefeller and Flagler, were parties to the contract at the time of its execution.
The bill then alleged a breach of the agreement on the part of
the defendants, and-.prayed (1) that the partnership 'under the
agreement should be dissolved; -(2) for an account and payment in
accordance 'with it: (3) for discovery in aid of the account, and
(4) for an order restraining the defendants from disposing of, or
improperly interfering with, the property of the partnership, pende Me.
9%e case was docketed to March term 1878. On February 21st
1878, an answer was filed by the defendants, denying the material
allegations of the bill ; on the same day the case was argued upon
a motion for the appointment of a receiver, and on the 25th of
February a decree wa entered, appointing a receiver.
On March 5th 1878, a petition was presented and filed by
Rockefeller and Flagler, two of the defendants, setting forth that
they were citizens of .Ohio, that of the other defendants, Warden,
Lockart Frew, and the Atlantic Refining Co., were citizens of
Pennsylvania, and that the Pratts and Rogers, the other defendants, were citizens of New York. That of the complainants, Taylor was a citizen of New York, and the others of Pennsylvania;
that the citizenship existed as stated, at the time of the commencement of the litigation, and continued down to the time of the
filing of the petition; that the controversy was of a civil nature;
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in equity, and that the sum in dispute exceeded, exclusive of
costs, the sum of $500. The petition further alleged that the controversy was wholly between citizens of different states-the complainants, citizens of New York and Pennsylvania, and the petitioners defendants, citizens of Ohio-and that it was brought for
the purpose of restraining and enjoining the petitioners. That
although Warden and others were joined as defendants in the bill;
they were only nominally parties, and that the controversy was
capable of a final determination between the complainants and the
petitioning defendants alone. It further set forth that the petition
was filed before the term at which the cause could have been first
legally tried, and that a bond had been filed with good and sufficient surety conditioned as required by law. The petition prayed
that the court should proceed no further in the case, but should
order its removal and certify the record to the Circuit Court of the
United States, for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
The court (McJuNKn, P. J.), after argument, filed an elaborate
opinion, in which, after conceding that the application for removal
was made in time, and that the bond offered was sufficient, he
refused to order the removal of the cause, on the ground that from
the record, which was the only legal evidence of the facts, it could
not be discovered that the controversy was one that could be wholly
decided and determined between the complainants and the petitioning defendants without the presence of the other defendants, and
that, therefore, notwithstanding the difference of citizenship, the
case did not come within the terms of federal legislation in regard
to the removal of causes from the state courts, even of the Statute
of 3d March 1875. (See 25 Pitts. L. J. 187.)
The petitioners, Rockefeller and Flagler, thereupon filed a certified copy of the record in this court. The complainants now
move to remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas of Butler county.
George Shiras, Jr., X

W. Acheson and John X1. AXiTer, for

the motion.

.Rufus P. Ranney, Ae"Junkin &. Campbell, Hampton & Dalzell,
Robert Woods and D. T. Watson, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG,

J.-Three reasons are assigned in support of the motion
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to remand this case to the state court. They are as follows: First,
that the application to remove the case into this court was not
made in time; secondly, that if the application was in time the
record discloses that the state court, in the due and orderly exercise
of its own jurisdiction, has adjudged that the record and petition
did not exhibit a case proper for remQval under the Acts of Congress, and has refused to part with its jurisdiction; and thirdly,
that the record clearly shows this court can have no jurisdiction of
the case.
Of the first reason little need be said. The Act of Congress of
3d March 1875, has greatly enlarged the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Courts of the United States, and enlarged correspondingly the right
of removal of civil suits from the state courts. The second section
of the act enacts as follows : "That any suit of a civil nature, at
jaw, or in equity, now pending or hereafter brought in any state
court, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or-value of $500, and arising under the constitution or laws
of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made under
their authority, or in which the United States shall be plaintiff or
petitioner, or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens
of different states, or a controversy between citizens of the same
state, claiming lands under grants of different states, or a controversy between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects, either party may remove said suit into the Circuit Court of
the United States for the proper district. And when in any suit
mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy which is
wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully
determined, as between them, then either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such controversy, may
remove said suit into the Circuit Court of the United States for the

proper district."
The third section prescribe§ the time when such removal may be
made, and the manner in which it may be effected. It enacts that
either party, or any one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants entitled
to remove the suit, may make and file in the suit in the state court a
petition for the removal before or at the term at which the cause
could be first tried, and before the trial thereof, together with a
bond with surety, &c. It is then made the duty of the state court
to accept the petition and bond, and proceed no further in the suit.
The petition and bond must be filed "before or at the term at which
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the cause could be first tried, and before the trial thereof." In this
case the bill was brought to March term 1878, of the state court.
It was filed on the 8th of February 1878; a motion was instantly
made for a receiver, and the 20th of February was assigned for
hearing the motion. On the 18th of February the defendants entered their appearance, and moved to postpone hearing of the motion
for a receiver until the 27th. This motion the court denied, but
postponed the hearing one day. On the 21st of February the defendants filed a joint answer under oath, denying most of the material averments of the bill, together with affidavits. On February
25th the court appointed a receiver, and on the 5th of March 1878,
the petition for removal of the suit into this court was filed together
with the required bond. They were filed before the first term of
the Common Pleas, subsequent to filing the bill, commenced. This
recital of the facts, as they appear by the record, without more, is
sufficient to show that the application for removal was made in due
time.
The second reason advanced for .remanding the case is equally
without merit. If a proper petition and bond were filed in due
season, as we have seen they were, and if the petition and record
exhibited a case which the petitioners had a right to remove, it was
not in the power of the state court to deny the right by any judgment it could give. The Act of Congress declares that after the
petition and bond are filed, the state court shall proceed no further
in the suit. The petition is filed in the suit. It thus is made part
of the record, and, by the act of filing, the suit is withdrawn from
the jurisdiction of the state court. It may be admitted that when
the petition, read in connection with the other parts of the record,
does ndt show a case of which the Circuit Court has jurisdiction,
the jurisdiction of the state court is not ousted. In such a case that
court may proceed. It may, therefore, examine the petition and
record, but its judgment upon the question whether a proper case
appears for removal is not conclusive upon the Circuit Court. It is
to be observed that no order of the state court for a removal is
necessary; certainly none, since the act of 1875. Nor is any allowance required. The allowance is made by the statute. Hence
when the petition and record exhibit a case for removal, coming
within the statute, all jurisdiction of the state court terminates. It
has even been said every subsequent exercise of jurisdiction by that
court is " coram non judice," null and void. Such was the language
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of the Supreme Court in Gordon v. Longert, 16 Pet. 97, and the
declaration has been repeated in other courts. This would seem to
follow from the fact that subsequent action by the state court is
expressly prohibited by the Act of Congress. But whether the
declaration was strictly accurate when it was made, or not; whether
subsequent exercise of jurisdiction by the state court was not void,
but merely erroneous, it is unimportant now to consider; for plainly
since, by the Act of 1875, the power of removal and the jurisdiction of the federal court is made independent of any action or nonaction of the-state court upon the application. The 5th section of
the act requires the Circuit Court to dismiss a suit which has been
removed, or remand it whenever it shall appear to its satisfaction
that it does not involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. A decision of the state court,
therefore, that the cause sought to be removed is one of which the
Circuit Court has jurisdiction, can have no effect. It cannot force
jurisdiction upon the Circuit Court, nor can it deny jurisdiction to
it And further the 7th section empowers the Circuit Court, to
which any cause shall be removable under the act, to issue a writ
of certiorari to the state court, commanding said court to make
return of the record in any such cause, removed as aforesaid, or in
which any one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants have complied
with the provisions of the act for the removal of the same, and
enforce said writ according to law. Surely it would be no sufficient
return to such a writ that the state court had decided the case was
not one which could be removed, or had decided that the Circuit
Court had no jurisdiction. So also it may be inferred from another
provision of the act that no action of the state court can prevent or
hinder the removal. A severe penalty is imposed upon the clerk
of the state court who shall refuse to any one or more of the parties
applying to remove a cause, a copy of the record therein, after tender
of the legal fees for such copy. The copy must be furnished for
filing in the Circuit Court to any party applying for removal, without reference to any action the state court may have taken.
For these reasons we think the refusal of the Court of Common
Pleas to allow the removal of the case into this court is immaterial.
The third reason urged in support of the motion to remand is the
most important one. If it be true indeed that the case is one of
which this court has no jurisdiction, it is our duty to remand it to
the court from which it has been removed. Whether we have juris-
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diction or not depends both upon the citizenship of the parties and
the controversy involved. What the citizenship is must be determined from the bill filed by the plaintiffs; and to the bill with its
exhibit, the answer and the petition for removal, alone, can we look
for the controversy between the parties, so far as it bears upon our
jurisdiction. Taylor, one of the plaintiffs, is a citizen of New
York, and his co-plaintiffs are citizens of Pennsylvania. Rockefeller and lagler, the petitioners for removal, are two of the defendants, and they are both citizens of Ohio. The other defendants
sued with Rockefeller and Flagler, are citizens either of Pennsylvania or of New York. The petitioners are therefore citizens of
a different state from those of which the plaintiffs are citizens,
though some of the plaintiffs and some of the defendants are citizens
of the same state, viz., Pennsylvania. Such being the citizenship,
it may be admitted that, as the law was before the enactment of the
Act of 1875, the petitioners would have had no right to remove
the case into the Circuit Court, and that court would have had no
jurisdiction, because each of the plaintiffs was not capable of suing
each of the defendants in a federal court. So it was ruled in
Strawbridge v. Curtis, 3 Cranch 267, when the 12th section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 was under consideration, and this has been
the constant construction of that act. Similar rulings have been
made with reference to the acts of 1866 and 1867; case of the
Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553; Knapp v. Railroad
Co., 20 Wall. 122. Such was the general rule. It was not, however, of universal application. Even in &rawbridge v. Curtis, the
court declined giving an opinion of a case where several parties
represent several distinct interests, and some of the parties are, and
others are not competent to sue, or liable to be sued in the courts
of the United States. And the rule has often been held not to
apply to merely formal parties. Thus in Wood v. .Davis, 18 How.
468, it was" said by the Supreme Court: "It has been repeatedly
decided by this court, that formal parties, or nominal parties, or
parties without interest united with the real parties to the litigation,
cannot oust the federal courts of jurisdiction, if the citizenship or
character of the real parties be such as to confer it." The court
has gone much farther. In Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 139, speaking of parties to a bill in equity, they were described as-st,
formal parties; 2d, necessary parties; and 3d, "persons who not
only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a
VOL.-XXVII. 39
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nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting
that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its
final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and
good conscience." Such are indispensable parties. -And subsequent
decisions held that it is only when an indispensable party defendant
was a citizen of the same state with the plaintiff that the jurisdiction of the federal courts was defeated. Ober v. Gallagher, 93
U. S. 204.
But, whatever may have been the doctrine held prior to the Act
of Congress of 1875, that Act has introduced great changes of the
law. The 1st section extends the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
nearly, if not quite as far as the 2d section of the 3d article of the
constitution authorizes, alike in regard to the subject-matter of
suits, and to the citizenship of the parties. It adopts the words of
the constitution. The 2d section relates to the removal of suits
from state courts into United States Circuit Courts, and it follows
the language of the 1st section. Hence, any cause which might
have been commenced in the Circuit Court, either because of its
subject-matter or the citizenship of the parties, may be removed
from a state court into the federal one. The question always is
whether, on account of the citizenship of the parties or the subject
of the controversy, the federal court has jurisdiction.
Whether since the Act of 1875, the right of removal extends to
all cases in which some of the necessary or indispensable defendants
are citizens of the same state with the plaintiffs or some of them is
no doubt a very important question, not yet decided. It does not,
if the rule of construction applied to the Judiciary Act of 1789,
and the Acts of 1866 and 1867, is applicable to the later act. But
the later act, for the first time, adopts the language of the constitution, and seems to have been intended to confer on the circuit
courts all the jurisdiction which, under the constitution, it was in
the power of Congress to bestow. Certainly the case mentioned
-would be a controversy between citizens of different states, and the
reasons which induced the framers of the constitution to give jurisdiction to the federal courts of controversies between citizens of
different states apply as strongly to it as they do to a case in which
all the defendants are citizens of- a state other than that in which
the plaintiffs are citizens; and if that instrument is to be construed
so as to carry out its intent, it would seem the question should be
answered in the affirmative. However, that may be, it is certain
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th, Act of 1875 confers a right to remove cases which could not
have been removed under any former act. It expressly declares
that when in any suit mentioned in the second section, there shall
be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different states,
and which can be fully determined as between them, then either
one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants, actually interested in
such controversy, may remove said suit into the Circuit Court. It
is not where the controversy, or even the main controversy is
between such citizens. The meaning, of the clause is not obscure.
In many suits there are numerous subjects of controversy, in some of
which one or more of the defendants is actually interested, and other
defendants are not. The right of removal is given where any one
of those controversies is wholly between citizens of different states,
and can be fully determined as between them, though there may
be other defendants actually interested in other controversies embraced in the suit. The clause, "1acontroversy which can fully
be determined as between them," read in connection with the other
words, "actually interested in such controversy," implies that
there may be other parties to-the suit, and even necessary parties,
who are not entitled to remove it. Such other parties must be
indispensable to a determination of that controversy which is wholly
between the citizens of different states; or their being parties -to the
action is no obstacle to a removal of the case into the Circuit Court.
If this is a correct construction of the Act of Congress, the case
in hand is free from difficulty. The petition of Rockefeller and
Flagler for removal, asserts that the controversy is wholly between
them and the plaintiffs, and that as between them it can be fully
determined. The motion to remand traverses no fact set out in the
petition. It simply presents the question whether the facts asserted
in the record show that under the Act of Congress the case was
improperly removed, and that this court has no jurisdiction of it.
The fifth section of the act provides that, if at any time it shall
appear that such suit does not really and substantially involve a
dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, that court shall proceed no further therein, but shall
remand it to the court from which it was removed. Looking then
to the bill and answer, do they involve such a controversy? We
cannot doubt that they do.
The bill, with its exhibit, made a part of the bill, charges that
the plaintiffs, together with one Vandergift, and one Foreman, sold
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an undivided half interest in their oil producing properties to the
defendants (not naming them), and entered into a partnership -with
the defendants (not naming them), having for its object the prchase and operation of oil producing territory, and the production
and sale of crude petroleum. It further charges that, at the time
of entering into the contract of partnership, a written contract was
executed between certain trustees of the first part, the plaintiffs,
and Yandergift and Foreman, of the second part, and Rockefeller
and Flagler of the t hird part, confirmed by the other parties defendant, providing for the manner in which the title to the lands and
property of the partnership should be"acquired, held and disposed
of; and fixing a limitation and method of dissolution of the partnership. A copy of this agreement is annexed to the bill, and made
a part of it. From the -whole tenor of the bill, it is evident that
agreement is what is called the contract of partnership. But on
reference to it, its purpose was not to create or evidence a partnership.. It is a mere declaration of trust. The parties to it are
Taylor and Bushnell, two trustees, of the first part, whose duty is
to. hold the lands conveyed to them, and to manage them, to
operate, control and sell them for the sole and exclusive benefit of
Taylor, Vandegrift, Foreman, Pitcairn and Satterfield, of the
second part, and Rockefeller and Flagler, of the third part. There
are no other partics to the agreement. The parties mentioned as
of the third part ae petitioners for the removal of the case. They
are the only defendants named in the contract. The other defendants, it is true, appear to have joined in one of the conveyances of
land conveyed to the trustees, and by a separate instrument they
expressed assent to the agreement, and declared that their conveyance was made for the purpose set forth in it. But they entered
into no covenants, and assumed no obligations to the plaintiffs.
Looking more minutely to the contract, it appears that Taylor and
Bushnell, the trustees, and parties of the first part, were constituted managers of the property and the interests of the trust, for a
compensation to be fixed. All the other parties were at best mere
cestui gu trustent, and it was stipulated that in case profits were
divided, they, together with all proceeds of sale, should be divided
monthly, or oftener if the executive committee should so decide,
and paid one-half to Taylor for the second party, and the other
half to Henry M. Flagler for the third party. Beyond doubt,
therefore, Rockefeller and Flagler are the main defendants in this
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suit. There are no other indispensable defendants. If those who
have not petitioned for a removal of the suit into this court have
any interest at all in it, it is because Rockefeller and Flagler, the
petitioners, are their trustees; a matter in which the plaintiffs have
no interest. Conceding that those other defendants are cestuis que
trustent of Rockefeller and Flagler, which does not clearly appear,
they are not necessary parties to the bill. They are represented
by their trustees: Kerrison,Assignee, v. Stewart, 93 U. S. R. 159.
And the fact that they have been made parties by the plaintiffs
is, under the Act of 1875, no obstacle to the removal of the case
into the federal court: 2 Wood's Cir. C. Rep. 126; Osgood v. Railroad Co., 6 Bis. 330; Turner v. Railroad Co., Dillon on Removal
of Causes 84, note. The case, therefore, plainly involves a controversy which is wholly between the plaintiffs and Rockefeller,
and which can be fully determined as between them. If there are
other controversies, in which the other defendants are interested,
they are merely incidental; they are not the main controversy.
The real controversy, as appears on the face of the bill, independent of the answer and the petition for removal, is between the plaintiffs and Rockefeller and Flagler, the second and third parties to
the trust agreement. This is true whether the third parties are
solely interested in one-half of the trust property, or whether they
are trustees of the other defendants.
Indeed, according to the literal reading of the statute (a reading
quite in harmony with the constitution), the right of removal, and
the jurisdiction of this court exists, though the controversy between
the plaintiffs and the defendants who are petitioners for the removal be not the main controversy in the case. It is enough if there
be a controversy wholly between citizens of different states which
can be fully determined as between them, though it may not be
fully determined as between the plaintiffs and the other defendants.
The phrase "as between them" is significant. And there is no
necessary embarrassment attending such a removal. The entire
suit is removed because of the controversy it involves between citizens of different states, and the Circuit Court, having thus obtained
jurisdiction, is competent to determine all the controversies involved between the plaintiffs and the other defendants. The other
questions are regarded as incidental. This is in accordance with
the acknowledged practice, and with the adjudications. It has even
been ruled that supplementary, auxiliary, or dependent proceedings,
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though commenced by original bill, and involving only controversies between citizens of the same state, will be entertained in the
federal courts, when necessary to a complete determination of all
the matters growing out of the controversy in those courts, between
citizens of different states. Jones v. Andrews, 10 Wall. 833, and
cases in note.
But in this case it is unnecessary to invoke such decisions. The
case, as exhibited by the bill of the plaintiffs, is one of property
equitably held in common, to be managed and divided as stipulated
in an agreement, and the object of the suit is to terminate the trust
declared, and to have the property sold and divided according to
the equities of the parties interested. The agreement itself provides how the division shall be made. Any rights to the profits,
or proceeds of sale, not belonging to the second or third parties,
that is not belonging to the plaintiffs, or Rockefeller and Flagler,
are only incidental. The entire property described in the agreement, together with all rights to it, and all duties in relation to it,
and all duties in relation to its management, belongs to the plaintiffs
and Rockefeller and lagler. If the other defendants have claims
against the latter, they are outside of the real. controversy, and
claims in which the plaintiffs have no interest.
We think, therefore, the case was properly removed into this
court, and the motion to remand it to the state court is denied.
McKEN'lAN, J., concurred.
Since the last edition of Judge DinLox's pamphlet, on the Removal of
Causes, appeared in 1877, several important decisions have been rendered,
in cases that arose under the provisions
of the Act of March 3d 1875. It is
proposed to consider these cases, as
well as the questions decided in the
princpal case, with relbrene, first, to
the effect of the decisions of the state
court on the removal of the cause;
secondly, the effect of the Act of 3d
March 1875 upon prior legislation;
thirdly, the time within which the removal may be made; and finally, the
parties to the removal.
I. It was held in the principal case,
that the jurisdiction of the state court is
not ousted, unless the record and peti-

tion show a case of which the United
States court has jurisdiction; but the
judgment of the state court to that
effect is not binding upon the United
States court; and if the latter court
holds that the cause has been improperly removed, a contrary decision by
the state court has no effect. The
Court of Common Pleas No. 3, of Philadelphia county, in Dunham v. Baird,
1 W. N. C. 493, held that the cause
could not be removed to the United
States court, on account of the supposed
want of proper citizenship of the parties.
The cause was subsequently removed to
the Circuit Court for the Eastern Dis.
trict of Pennsylvania, and a motion to
remand was denied by the court, McKENNAN, J., holding that no action by
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the state court was required by the Act
of 3d 'March 1873, upon the petition or
bond. It was for the United States
courts to determine the sufllcieney of
the latter, when questioned. CADWALADER, J., concurred. The same court,
in .1c10urdy v. Life Ins. Co., 4 W. N.
C. 18, held, in remanding the cause,
that the plaintiff was not guilty of
lacIes, in not opposing the removal
before the state court, since that court
had no longer jurisdiction, after the petition and bond were filed, to decide the
right of removal, that being wholly
within the jurisdiction of this court.
And, again, in Arthur's Adrn'r v.,V. E.
31. L4 Ins. Co., 6 W. N. C. 403, McKE .NA!,,

J., held that when the peti-

tion and bond were rightly filed, the
jurisdiction of the state court ipso facto
ceased, provided the removal is perfected by the filing of the copy of the
record in the federal court. In Ex
parte, Grimball, 8 Cent. L. J. 151, the
Supreme Court of Alabama held it to
be the duty of the state court to examine the petition for removal, in order to
ascertain whether the- cause may be
properly removed.
II. The only changes introduced by
the part of the second section of the
Act of 1875, which refers to a "controversy between citizens of different
states," are, that either the plaintiff or
defendant may remove the cause, and
that it is no longer necessary that either
party should be a citizen of the state in
which the suit is brought ; but it still
remains necessary that the state citizenship of each individual plaintiff should
be different from the state citizenship
of each individual defendant, to authorize a removal under this section : Pctersen v. Chapinan, 13 Blateh. 395 (Circuit Court for the Northern District of
New York). In llMarner v. T,e Railroad Co., 13 Blatchf. 231, the same
court decided that, prior to the Act of 3d
March 1875. a suit in a state court, which
fell within the description of removable

caues, might be removed, although it
could not originally have been brought
in the federal court ; and this principle
is not changed by the fifth section of the
Act of 3d March 1875, which provides
for the remanding or dismissal of
causes, by the federal courts, not really
or substantially involving a controversy within their jurisdiction. In MeMurdy v. Life Ins. Co., supra, the bond
filed was conditional for the filing of a
copy of the record of the proceedings in
the state court upon the first day of the
succeeding term of the Circuit Court, in
the latter court, but did not provide, as
is r(quir(d by the third section of the
Act of 1875, for the payment of costs,
if the suit should be held, by the Circuit Court, to have been "improperly
removed. The court held this to be a
fatal defect, and remanded the cause,
inter alia, on the ground that the requirements as to the nature of the bond
extended to all cases mentioned in the
second section, and to that extent, at
least, repealed all prior acts upon this
subject. In Cooke v. Fordetal., 16 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 417, it was held by the
Circuit Court of Kentuckythat the Act of
3d March 1875, does not entirely repeal
J 639, Rev. Stat., relating to the removal of causes. The third subdivision
of 639, Rev. Stat., is not inconsistent
with the Act of 1875, and is not repealed
by it, and the court laid down the three
following rules :1. No citizen of a state in which a
suit is brought can remove it, except on
petition filed, before or at the term, at
which the cause could first be tried.
2. Where a suit is between citizens
of different states, neither of whom is a
citizen of the state in which the suit is
brought, neither party can remove it,
except on petition, before or at the term,
at which the cause could first be tried;
and
3. When the suit is between a citizen
of the state in which it is hrouht and a
citizen of another state, the latter may
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remove it, by petition filed at any time
before trial or final hearing, upon making an affidavit of prejudice or local influence, *Vhich will prevent a fair trial.
The repeal of statutes is not favored,
and will not be allowed by the court,
unless the two are antagonistic and incapable of being reconciled. In the -New
Jersey Zinc Co. v. Trotter, 17 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 376, it was held by Nixox,
J., in the District Court of New Jersey,
that the second and third subdivisions of
J 639, Rev. Stat., are not repealed by
the Act of 1875. This was a suit brought
in the state court by a corporation of
New Jersey against three defendants,
two being citizens of New Jersey, and
one a resident of New York. The latter answered to the merits of the case,
and removed the cause to the United
States court. On motion to remand, it
was held that the controversy could be
determined without the presence of the
other two defendants, and that the controversy as to them was removable under the second subdivision of J 639,
Rev. Stat., and the motion was refused.
I1.In Buddy v. Havens, 3 W. N. C.
432, Judge Han held, in the Court of
Common Pleas No. 2, of Philadelphia
county, the "1next term" under the Act
of 3d March 1875, to be the next term
at which the case could be legally tried,
but not actually. If, owing to a crowded
docket, the case could not be reached till
the third term after it was at issue, a
petition to remove it then is too late.
This cause was removed to the Circuit
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The court remanded it, and
held, following the decision of Judge
HARE, and that of Judg3 DirLoN, to
the same effect,
that the words " before"
or "at" the term at which the cause
could be first tried, meant the term at
which the cause was first triable on its
merits; and the court followed the record alone, and took no testimony on
the subject. But what is the term at

which the cause could be first tried f
Does the language of the statute refer
to the first term during the whole of which
the cause was triable, or to the first term
during any portion of which the cause
was in that condition ? Suppose the
cause is put at issue on the last day of
the state term, is either party precluded
from removing the cause on account of
the accidental shortness of time left for
making and filing his petition and bond ?
This seems unreasonable, and the better
view would appear to be that the term
at which the cause could be first tried
refers to a whole term of the state court,
during which it is in the option of either
party to remove the cause. In Dunham
v. Baird, supra, the cause had been at
issue and triable when the Act of 3d
March 1875 was passed, nearly a year.
There were four yearly terms in the
state court in which the action was
pending, the return-day of that term,
during which the Act of Congress was
passed, being the 1st of March. The
next term began on the first Monday of
June,.and the petition was not filed till
the twelfth of that month. It was argued
that the time for removal had elapsed
with the March term. As the cause was
at issue prior to that term, that was
the term at which the cause could be
first tiied. The removal should have
been made during the March term
(i. e., during the months of March,
April or May). But the state court,
though refusing to assent to the removal, expressly negatived the argument. "The return-day," said LuDLow, P. J., "of the March term was
Ist March, a divided term is not judicially cognizable; the March term had
passed in contemplation of law on 3d
March," (the day on which the act was
passed). So, on the same page, that
judge said, "The act was only passed
on 3d March 1875, during the term preceding this. This was, therefore, the
first term succeeding the Act of Congress at which the cause could be tried."
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And the same view was taken in this
case by McKENVA., Circuit Judge (2
W. N. C. 52). It will be remembered
that the language of the act provides for
the removal "before or at the term at which
the said cause could befirst tried, and before the trial thereof;" and it is difficult to see how this definition is fulfilled
if predicated of a term which is one,
not at which, but during only a part of
which "said cause could be first tried."
It would seem, therefore, both on reason
and authority, that the removal term is
the term succeeding that during which the
cause is put at issue.
In Gurnee v. City of Brunswick, I
Hughes 270, WAITE, C. J., held that
"the application to remove must be
made at or before the first term at
which the cause may be tried, i. e.,
when the cause is ready for trial, although the court and parties may not
be ready to try it." The same case
further decided that, as an appeal from
the board of supervisors, under the laws
and practice in Virginia, to a county
court, is triable without pleadings at the
first term of the court after the appeal
is taken, an application for removal
must then be made at that term. The
word Iterm" is a term occurring after
the passage of this act: Bank v. Whleeler,
13 ]3atch. 218 ; Dunham v. Baird, supra. A default taken on demurrer is a
trial within the meaning of the act:
Bright v. Railroad Co., I Abb. N. Cas.
14. An application filed after the cause
was called for trial, and the plaintiff
was ready, but time was given the defendant to present an application for a
continuance, was held to be too late for
a removal: I Vait v. White, 46 Tex.
338. It was further held in Gurnee v.
Brunswick City, supra, that if the term
occurs during the time a trial of the
cause is stayed by an order of the state
court, that is not such a term as is meant
by the act. The court left undecided
whether the third subdivision of 639,
Rev. Stat., allowing the removal of
VOL. XXVII.-40

causes to the United States courts on
the ground of prejudice or local influence, has been repealed by the Act of
3d March 1875. It was held by the
Supreme Court of the United States in
Lowe v. Williams, 4 Otto 650, that a
suit pending in an appellate state court,
after it has been prosecuted to final judgment in a court of original jurisdiction,
cannot be removed to the Circuit Court
of the United States. A case pending
in the Supreme Court of the state at
the time the Act of 3d March 1875 was
passed, and which was sent back to
the lower court for further proceedings,
stands like a new cause, and the right
of removal exists ; the defendants are
not bound to take any action with regard to the removal till the case has
been redocketed by the plaintiff: Pettiloi
v. Noble, 7 Biss. 449 (Northern District
of Illinois). In the principal case the
petition for removal of a suit in equity
was filed in the state court during the
term in which the bill was filed, but
subsequently to the filing of the answer
and the appointment of a receiver by
that court. The petition was held to be
filed in time under the Act of 1875, requiring the filing to be made "1before"
or "at" the term at which the cause
could be first tried, and before the trial
thereof.
IV. In Peterson v. Chapman, supra,
an action of trover was brought by citizens of New York against a citizen of
New York and citizens of Connecticut
in the state court. The defendants removed the cause. The cause was remanded on the ground that the controversy was not one between citizens of
different states. For to entitle a party
to a removal, it is necessary that the
citizenship of each individual plaintiff be
different from that of each individual defendant. This was considered to be still
an open question in the principal case,
and the above case was not referred to.
The court held in Carraherv. Brennan,
7 Biss. 497 (in the Northern District of

TAYLOR v. ROCKEFELLER.
Illinois), that a removal will only be
allowed, when the controversy is so
completely between citizens of different
states, that its termination will settle the
whole suit, and it is not enough that the
citizens of different states are interested
in the controversy, but they must have
such an interest that, when the question
as to them is settled, the suit is determined. The whole suit must be removed; a fragment cannot be, because
a party interested in that fragment is a
citizen of another state from that of the
plaintiff. In Hervey v. L M. Ruailroad
Co., 7 Biss. 103, it was also decided that
a part of a controversy cannot be removed; and, further, that foreign citizens, where they do not constitute the
entire plaintiff or defendant, cannot remove a suit, as the Act of 3d March
1875, only contemplates those suits
which are between citizens of one of the
states of the Union, on the one side, and
citizens and subjects of foreign states, on
the other : Hervey v. RailroadCo., supra.
A controversy between citizens of a territory, and between citizens of the District of Columbia and citizens of a state,
is not a controversy between citizens of
different states: Mcilfurdy v. Life Ins.
Co., supra. The Common Pleas No.
3, of Philadelphia county, held that a
case, where a citizen is sued in his own
state court by a citizen of another state,
is not within the language of the constitution providing for controversies between citizens of different states : Dunham v. Baird, 1 W. N. C. 493; but the
cause was subsequently removed to the
Circuit Court, and the removal was held
by that court to have been a proper removal : 2 W. N. C. 52. In Leutz v.
Butterfield, 52 How. Pr. 376, a citizen
of New York sued a citizen of Massachusetts in the state court. The plaintiff was assignee of another citizen of
Massachusetts, of the claim in dispute.
An application to remove was denied by
the Common Pleas of New York, but
the court in bane held the cause to be

removable, though the suit could not
have originally been brought in the federal court. It was held in the principal
case that the court, in the question of
citizenship, will look to that of the trustee, and not that of the cestui que trust:
also, that a suit may be removed, in
which there are several controversies
between citizens of different states, and
of which one is wholly determinable as to
them, and this is true, though others of
the same party with petitioners for the
removal, actually interested in other
controversies embraced in the same suit,
could not, on account of having the
same citizenship with some of the other
party, have themselves removed the
suit; and also, that a controversy wholly
between citizens of different states, fully
determinable as between themselves, entitles either party to removal, though not
fully determinable as between the remaining parties.
In Gerardey v. Moore, 4 American
Law Times 387, Mr, Justice BnADLEX
held, that the cause fell properly under
the Act of 1866, but he expressed his
opinion at considerable length to the
effect that under the Act of 3d March
1875, all the individual plaintiffs need
not have a different citizenship from all
the individual defendants, and his honor
said of the indispensable parties to the
suit," if someof the plaintiffs and defendants are citizens of the same state, the
removal must be sought by all the defendants ; one of the plaintiffs, or one of
the several defendants cannot in this
case remove the cause, but if all the
plaintiffs on the one hand, and all the
defendants on the other, are citizens of
different states, then it does not require
all the plaintiffs nor all the defendants
to remove the cause, but any one of
them may do so."
Mr. Justice I[LLER, in Board of
Comm'rs v. Kansas PacificRailroad Co.,
5 Cent. L. J. 102, appeared to entertain
the same opinion. That cause, however,
he refused to remand on the ground
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that the controversy, after removing the
unnecessary parties to the suit, was wholly between citizens of different states.
In Ex parte Grimball, supra, the trustee of A. filed a bill in the state court
against the brothers and sisters of A.,
her administrator and her husband. All
the parties to the suit were citizens of
Alabama except A.'s husband, who was
a citizen of New York. A.'s husband
filed a petition to remove the cause into
the federal court. The Supreme Court
of Alabama held, affirming the decree
of the chancellor, and following the
dicta of Justices MILLER and BRADLEY, that as none of the other defendants had joined A.'s husband in the petition for the removal, and as the controversy was not one "wholly between
citizens of different states" the jurisdiction of the state court was not ousted,
as the petition did not show a ground
of removal under any act.
Besides the cases thathave beeU considered under the four preceding categories, several others have been decided
under the Act of 3d March 1875, which
it is, perhaps, more proper to consider
under separate heads.

receiver is in the nature of a final
decree, and second, because the proceedings in the chancery of New Jersey are
under a local statute, and the cause
could not have been litigated in a federal court. But the decree of the chancellor can have no extra territorial jurisdiction, and the application for leave to
enforce the plaintiff's rights with regard to the road in Pennsylvania, will
be considered by this court, for the receiver is the servant of this court.
BOND AND PETITiON.-The bond must
be conditional for payment of costs by
the parties removing the cause, in case
the federal court should be of the opinion that the cause was improperly removed : .clurdy v. L fe Ins. Co., supra. A petition for the removal of a
cause is insufficient unless it sets forth
in due form, such as is required in good
pleading, the essential facts not otherwise appearing in the case. This is a
condition precedent to the removal of
the cause, under the Act of Congress:
Gold-washing Co. v. Keys, 6 Otto 199.
RECORD .- Time of Filing-Who may
file it.-In Osgood v. Chioago, 4-c., Railroad Co., 14 Am.Law Reg. N. S. 51 8,the
court was doubtful as to what would be
PROCEEDINGrl STATE COURT UNDER
LOCAL STATUTE-TIME.-In The Le- the effect of filing the record of the state
high Coal and Natigation Co. v. Central court in the federal court, before the
Railroad of New Jersey, 4 W. N. C. term next after filing the petition and
187, the plaintiff had leased a road in bond in the state court, and whether
Pennsylvania to the defendant in New the case would be in every respect beJersey. A bill was presented by the fore the federal court prior to its next
former to the chancellor of New Jersey, term. In Arthur's Adm'r v. . E. M.
to the effect that the latter was insol- L!fe Ins. Co., supra, it was held, that
vent, and praying for the appointment
although it is optional with the party
of a receiver of the road in Pennsyl- petitioning whether he file the copy of
vania. The chancellor appointed a the record on or before the first day of
receiver, whose appointment was con- the then next session of the Circuit
firmed by the Circuit Court of Pennsyl- Court, the other party may, if he pIease,
vania. The plaintiff removed the cause file the copy himself, and in so doing is
to the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania, considered to have acted for the party
and an application was made to en- petitioning, and this may be done at any
force the plaintiff's rights in that court. time after the filing of the petition and
On motion to remand, the latter court bond in the state court.
held, that the cause must be remanded
W hEN ACTION OF STATE COURT
because, first, the appointment of a IS RECOGNISED IN FEDERAL COURT.
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-In Willianrs Mower and Reaper v.
Raynor, 7 Biss. 245, in the Circuit
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, an order had been made in
the state court to produce papers, &c.
This order was disobeyed, and proceedings for contempt were instituted. The
cause was subsequently removed to the
federal court. It was there held that
the latter court will recognise and enforce the order of the state court in the
contempt proceedings; but if an appeal
is taken to the superior court in the
state, on the order, the circuit court
will hold in abeyance the enforcement
of the order till the appeal is disposed
of; and the order for contempt will be
enforced, if such .proceedings were really
in aid of the civil suit.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITU-

27oN OR AN ACT OF CoNoRzss.-The
court held in Gold-washingCo. v. Keys,
supra, that a suit cannot be removed
under the second section of the Act of
3d March 1875, simply because in its
progress, a construction of the constitution or a law of the United States is
necessary, unless this construction, in
part at least, arises out of a controversy
in regard to the effect and operation of
some provision in that constitution or
law on the facts involved in the case.
JURISDICTION.-It was held in the

principal case that when a suit is re-

moved in which there are several controversies, and one controversy is
wholly between citizens of different
states, and determinable as to them, the
circuit court, upon such removal, obtains jurisdiction over the whole cause,
the remaining controversies therein being treated as incidental to that which
authorized the removal.
The Circuit Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that the 10th
clause of 628, Rev. Stat., giving the
United States courts jurisdiction "of all
suits by or against any banking association established in the district for
which court is held, under any law proriding for national banking associations" does not invest said courts with
exclusive jurisdiction over this class of
corporations, and if a suit is brought
against such associations in a state
court, the cause cannot be removed to
the federal courts. The jurisdiction of
the federal courts is only concurrent
with that of-the state.courts : Pertilon v.
Noble, supra.
The jurisdiction of the federal court
may arise during the peudency of a suit
in a state court by such a change in the
parties to the suit as would have entitled
a removal, if the cause had been originally between those parties. See Healy
v. Provost, 6 W. N. C. 578.
ARTHUR BIDDLE.

Supreme Court of Jgcon

-n.

THE APPLETON IRON CO. FT. AL., RESPONDENTS, V. THE BRITISH
AMERICA ASSURANCE CO., APPELLANT.
The mortgagee of chattels has the legal title to the property mortgaged, even
before the debt is due, and he may take immediate possession of the property
unless by express stipulation the mortgagor is permitted to retain possession.
Where, therefore, a person mortgaged chattels and insured the same, the loss,
If any, to be paid to the mortgagees as their mortgage interest should appear, the
policy containing a provision that if the property insured be sold or transferred,
or if any change takes place in title or possession, whether by legal process or
judicial decree, or voluntary transfer or conveyance, then in every such case said
dolicy shall be void, and the mortgagor was afterwards adjudicated .a bankrupt
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upon his own petition, and under an order of the U. S. District Court assigned
all his property to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors : Held, that such
assignment did not avoid the policy.
Where an insurance policy contained a clause that, if it should be assigned
before loss, without the consent of the company endorsed thereon, such assignment should avoid the policy : Held, that a general assignment of the property of
the assured to a trustee for the benefit of his creditors, executed by him under the
order of the U. S. District Court upon his being adjudicated bankrupt therein,
would not have the effect to transfer the policy to the trustee within the meaning
of this clause.
Where an insurance company knows at the time of issuing a policy upon chattels, that they are then mortgaged, and agrees to pay the loss to the mortgagees,
it is estopped from saying thereafter that the mortgagor had no insurable interest
.n the chattels when it issued the policy.
APPEAL

from the Circuit Court of Winnebago county.

Finch &. Barber, for appellant.
Charles W. Felker, for respondents.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
COLE, J.-The counsel for the defendant insists that the answer
states a complete defence ; that the proceedings in bankruptcy
therein set forth operated to change the title and possession of thd
property destroyed so as to avoid the policy. It is averred in the
answer that the insurance company issued its policy to the plaintiffl
the Appleton Iron Company, insuring the wood mentioned, and
thereby agreed to pay the other plaintiffs-who were mortgagees-the amount that should become due the Iron Company in case of
loss, as their mortgage interest should apppear. It is also averred
that the interest of the mortgagees in the property exceeded the
amount of the policy, so that the entire loss is payable to them.
The policy contains this clause or condition : "That if the property
insured be sold or transferred, or if any change takes place in title
or possession, whether by legal process or judicial decree, or voluntary transfer or conveyance, then in every such case said policy
shall be void."
It appears from the answer -thatthe Iron Company before the loss
occurred was on its own petition adjudicated a bankrupt by the
District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin; that pursuant to the terms of the Bankrupt Law, and
in accordance with a resolution of the creditors, a trustee was appointed to hold and distribute the estate ; and that the bankrupt, by
order of the District Court, did, by deed -of assignment, convey,
transfer and deliver all its property and effects (including the pro-

318

APPLETON IRON CO. v. BR. AM. ASSURANCE CO.

perty in the policy described), to the trustee, to be applied for the
benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt. It is further stated that
the trustee accepted the trust, and that the transfer of the property.
of the bankrupt to him by virtue of the deed of assignment was
without the knowledge or consent of the insurance company, and
worked a forfeiture of the policy. The question therefore is, was
the policy avoided by these proceedings in bankruptcy and the
assignment or transfer made by the bankrupt to the trustee under
the order of the District Court? The counsel for the defendant
insists that it was; that there was a transfer or change of the title
of the wood by legal process or judicial decree within the meaning
of the policy.
When considered with reference to the facts in this case we can
give no such effect to the bankrupt proceedings for this reason.
By the terms of the policy the loss was made payable to the plaintiffs, Smith, Donkersly and Smith, as their interest should appear.
It is admitted that their interest exceeded the amount of the policy.
They were the mortgagees of chattels; the whole legal title of the
wood was vested in them conditionally, leaving no such interest in
the bankrupt as would pass to the trustee under the deed of assignment. It is the settled law of this state that the mortgagee of
chattels has the legal title to the property mortgaged even before
the debt is due, and he may take immediate possession of the property unless by express stipulation the mortgagor is permitted to
retain possession. It is unnecessary to refer to the decisions of
this -court where these principles in regard to chattel mortgages are
affirmed or recognised. It is sufficient to say that it is'well established that such are the rights of the mortgagee of personal property. Consequently we think the assignment by the mortgagor to
the trustee, under the circumstances stated in the answer, really
worked no change in the title or possession of the wood. The title
remained in the same persons as before the assignment and as when
the property was insured. The interest of the parties in the same
was unchanged, and the insurance company was not released thereby
from its liability to pay the loss: Bragg v. New .EnglandHut. Life
Ins. Co., 25 N. H. 289. There is a plain ground for discrimination between this case and such cases as Adams v. The Rockingham
X. .Ins. Co., 29 Me.292.; Young v. Eagle F. Ins. Co., 14 Gray
150; -azard v. Franklin Af. F. Ins. Co., 7 R. I. 429, and Perry
v. Lorillard F. Ins. Co., 61 N. Y. 214, where it is held that an
adjudication in bankrupty against the insured and an assignment
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under the bankrupt law, or an assignment by the insured under
proceedings in insolvency is an alienation or transfer of property
within the meaning of such clauses in the policy and defeats a
recovery upon it. In those cases the insurance was upon real
estate, and an assignment by the insolvent or bankrupt might well
be held to operate as a transfer or change of title. A mortgage of
real estate under the modern doctrine in this country does not convey the fee to the mortgagee, and in that regard is distinguishable
from a mortgage of chattels which passes the entire legal title conditionally to the mortgagee. It is therefore not necessary in this
case to deny the correctness of the ,proposition that a transfer or
assignment by a mortgagor of real estate under insolvent or bankrupt proceedings, does work a substantial change in the title of the
insured property and put an end to the policy where it contains a
condition similar to the one before us. But here nothing passed by
the assignment to the trustee, neither the legal title nor beneficial
interest. It is clear that had the trustee attempted to interfere
with the wood, he would have been a trespasser, and liable as such,
the deed of assignment affording him no protection.
Of course the insurance company will not be heard to say that
the Appleton Iron Company had no insurable interest in the wood
when it issued the policy. For it knew that the wood was mortgaged at the time and agreed to pay the loss to the mortgagees. It
is manifest that the insurance was for the benefit of the Iron Company, for it might pay the mortgage-debt and become the owner of
the wood. At all events we must assume that when the contract
was entered into all the facts connected with the title were known
to the insurance company, and it saw fit to issue the policy with
full knowledge of the precise interest which the parties had in the
property. Nothing in fact has transpired since the policy was
issued which in any way affects the rights of the parties, or has
any bearing upon the liability of the company to pay for the loss,
except the proceedings in bankruptcy already alluded to. Under
these circumstances, we think the defendant is estopped from saying
that the Iron Company had no insurable interest in the wood when it
issued the policy. Such company certainly had an equity of
redemption, a right to defeat the title of the mortgagees by a performance of the conditions of the mortgage.
There is a still further fact stated in the second defence, upon
which considerable stress is laid by defendant's counsel. It is
alleged that the policy of insurance was specifically described by
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the Iron Company in its petition in bankruptcy, was mentioned as a
part of its estate, and was transferred to the trustee by the deed of
assignment. There is a clause in the policy that if it should be
assigned before loss, without consent of the company endorsed
thereon, this should avoid the policy. It is claimed that the deed
of assignment transferred the policy within the meaning of this
clause. But we think otherwise. It does not appear that the
policy was ever delivered to the trustee, or that there was any
actual assignment of it. A general assignment by the bankrupt
under the circumstances would not have the effect to transfer the
policy to the trustee.
We therefore think that the demurrer to the answer was properly
sustained.
Order affirmed.
It seems to be settled by the great
weight.of American authority, that, in
accordance with the decision in the
principal case, by a mortgage of chattels the legal title to the thing mortgaged passes to the mortgagee. As
stated by WRIGHT, J., jn Hill v. Beebe,
12 N. Y. 556, 565, "a chattel mort
gage is something more than a mere security. It is a conditional sale of the
thing mortgaged, and operates to transfer the legal title to the mortgagee, to
be defeated only by a full performance
of the condition. Nothing short of actual payment, in case of a breach of the
condition, before foreclosure or sale, or
a voluntary waiver or surrender, can
revest the legal title in the mortgagor."
The doctrine that a mortgage of chattels transfers to the mortgagee the legal
title to the thing mortgaged, is also
supported by the following cases : Buticr v. Miller, 1 N. Y. 496; Bank of
Rochester v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 497 ; Heyland v. Badger, 35 Cal. 404 ; ,Shuartv.
Taylor, 7 How. Pr. 251; Pasrhall v.
Eggart, 52 Barb. 371 ; Porterv. Parmley, 13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) I II; Stoddard
v. Dennison, 7 Id. 309; Brown v. Bement, 8 Johns. 96; Ackley v. Finch, 7
Cow. 290; Langdon v. Bud, 9 Wend.
80; Potchen v. Pierce, 12 Id. 61;

Rlanders v. Barstow, 18 Me. 357 ; .Randers v. Thomas, 12 Wis. 411 ; Robinson
v. Fitch, 26 Ohio St. 659.
The mortgagee's interest, according to
this class of cases, even before forfeitnre, where he has iot stipulated for the
right of possession for a definite period,
is nothing but a mere equity of redemption: Bil v. Beebe, 12 N. Y. 565 ;
Mattison v. Baucits, I N. Y. 295. And
in case of breach of condition, the title
at law becomes absolute in the mortgagee, leaving a mere equity in the
mortgagor: Helandv. Badger, 35"Cal.
404; Wright v. Ro&, 36 Id. 414 ; Flanders v. Thomas, 12 Wis. 411 ; Langdon
v. Bud, 9 Wend. 80; Pasrhall v. Eggart, 52 Barb. 371 ; Brown v. Bement,
8 Johns. 96; Porter v. Parmley, 13
Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 111; Stoddard v.
Dennison, 7 Id. 111 ; Flandersv. Barstow, 18 Me. 357 ; McLean v. Walker, 10
Johns. 141. See also Constant Y. Mattison, 22 Ill. 558 ; Dupuy v. Gibson, 36
d. 198, and the cases cited to the first
proposition in this note. Unless otherwise stipulated, according to this class of
cases the mortgagee has the right to
take possession of the chattel mortgaged,
immediately upon the execution of the
mortgage: Shuart v. Taylor, 7 How.
Pr. 251 ; Robinson v. Fitch, 26 Ohio St.
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659. See also Wheeler v. Robert;, 19
I1. 274. This class of cases also makes
a distinction between a pledge and a
mortgage of chattels in this, that in the
case of a chattel mortgage the possession ordinarily remains with the mortgagor, and the title is conveyed to the
mortgagee, while in the case of a pledge
it is necessary that the possession of
the chattel pledged should pass to the
pledgee, while the title remains in the
pledgor. See Sms v. Canfield, 2 Ala.
555 ; Gifford v. Ford, 5 Vt. 532 ; Conne v. Carpenter, 28 Vt. 237; Eastman
v. Avery, 23 Me. 248 ; Day v. Swift,
48 Id. 368; Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns.
258 ; Brown v. Bement, 8'Id. 97 ; McLean v. Walker, 10 Id. 471 ; Cortelyou
v. Lansing, 2 Cai. Cas. 200; Ward v.
Sumner, 5 Pick. 60 ; Ash v. Savage, 5
N. H. 545 ; Garlick v. James, 12 Johns.
146 ; Surber v. McClntic-, 10 W. Va.
242. See, however, Tucker V. Butffington, 15 Mass. 480 ; Bonsey v. Ame, 8
Pick. 236, where it is said that delivery
is necessary to a mortgage. See also
the Illinois cases cited below, which
seem to imply that possession must be
taken by the mortgagee before the legal
title will pass.
In Illinois a chattel mortgage is considered as but a conditional sale, and
when the mortgagor fails to perform
the condition, the title, so far as it is
held by the mortgagor, vests in the
mortgagee. Where the possession is
taken in accordance with the terms of
the mortgage, the title passes even
though debt be not then due: Durfee
v. Grinnell, 69 Ill. 371 ; Simmons v.
Jenkins, 76 Id. 479. See also Wentworth v. The People, 4 Seam. 553;
Constant v.
aftteson, 22 I1. 558 ; McConnell v. The People, 84 Id. 583. Until a forfeiture has accrued, the mortgagee in that state has, as it is said, only
a lien upon the pledge (sic) for the security of his claim against the mortgagor: Rhines v. Phelps, 3 Gilm. 634.
And before default or the exercise of
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the right to take possession under an
insecurity clause in the mortgage, the
general property is no considered as
being in the mortgagee so as to draw
to it a possession in law - Simnons v.
Jenkins, supra,
In Michigan the rule was originally
laid down in Tannahill v. Tuttle, 3
Mich. 104, that by a mortgage of chattels the whole legal title passed conditionally, and upon breach of condition
the title of the mortgagee became absolute at law; and that the general title being in the mortgagee, he was entitled to
the immediate possession of the property, and to hold until condition broken,
unless the parties stipulated otherwise.
See cases cited on page 110; also Mr.
Denslow's note to Tannahill v. Tuttle,
3 Mich. (Callaghan & Co.'s ed.) 104,
where the Michigan, Illinois and Wisconsin cases upon this general subject
are fully collected. In Michigan the
doctrine is well settled in accordance
with what is believed to be the better
opinion, that in respect to real estate a
mortgage conveys no title to the mortgagee before foreclosure, and is but a
security for the debt; and until the title
passes upon a foreclosure and sale of
the property, the mortgagee has no legal interest in the land, and is not entitled to the possession: Hogsett v. Ellis,
17 Mich. 363; Ladue v. Detroit 4- M.
RailroadCo., 13 Id. 380; Van Husanv.
Kanouse, 13 Id. 303 ; Caruthersv. Humphrey, 12 Id. 270 ; Wagar v. &one, 36
Id. 364. And by the more recent decisions of that State the law as to mortgages
of chattels has been made to harmonize
with the more reasonable and equitable
rule already prevailing as to mortgages
of realty, so that now in that State
mortgaged chattels do not cease to belong to the mortgagor until some steps
are taken to end his rights by the enforcement of the mortgage, and the
mortgage is considered a mere security
to the mortgagee, and not a transfer of
title. See People v. Bristol, 35 Mich.
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82; Flanders v. Chamberlain, 24 Id.
305 ; Kohl v. Lynn, 34 Id. 361 ; Lucking v. Wesson, 25 Id. 443; Cary v.
Hewitt, 28 Id. 228.
Although, irrespective of statutory
changes, the rule in Michigan as respects chattel mortgages is believed to
be contrary to the, great weight of
American authority, still it is so emi-

nently reasonable and equitable that it
ought ultimately to prevail, and both
real and chattel mortgages be placed
upon the same footing in accordance
with what the parties in nearly every
case intend to create, via., a mere security, and not a conveyance of their
title to the mortgagee.
Mm-Ral.. D. EWZLL.

United States arcuit Court, Northern District of llinois.
LEA & PERRINS v. DEAKIN.
The word "cWorcestershire," as applied to sauce, has become generic in meaning by constant use for a particular species of sauce, and the fact that persons reside in Worcestershire, England, and manufacture there a sauce which they call
"Worcestershire Sauce," does not give them the sole right to such application of
the term.
The plaintiffs having been cognisant for many years of the fact that there was
a particular kind of sauce manufactured by persons other than themselves, to
which this term was applied, and having for many years taken no steps to prevent it, there may be said to have been something in the nature of an acquiescence on their part in such manufacture.
A decree, nbt appealed from, rendered by the Master of the Rolls in England,
having jurisdiction both of the subject-matter and of the parties in a chancery
suit, in favor of a principal, refusing an injunction and dismissing a bill in equity
filed in such foreign court, to protect an alleged trade-mark, when.offered in proof
by the principal's agent in a chancery suit in a court of the United States, in
which he is a defendant, is a bar to such action, when both suits are upon the same
subject-matter of controversy, brought by the same plaintiffs, and when the bills
in both cases ask for an account and an injunction for the same reasons and for
substantially the same general relief.
It would be an anomaly that a principal could manufacture and sell a sauce in
England, and his agent could be restrained in the United States from selling such
sauce here, obtained fiom such principal.

Bogera & Appleton and Henry ff. olyer, for complainants.
Charles

_Pope and George C. Christian,for respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

DRummoND, J.-This case has been fully and ably argued by
the counsel of the respective parties, and as it has been pending for
a long time, although I have not had, from other engagements, the
opportunity of considering it so thoroughly as I could wish, I may
state now the conclusions at which I have arrived, without going
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Into any special detail of the reasons leading to such conclusions.
The plaintiffs are, and have been for a long time, the manufacturers of what has been called "Worcestershire Sauce,'" in Worcestershire, England. It is at present, and has been for some time,
known as "Lea & Perrins's Worcestershire Sauce." The defendant is a resident of Wisconsin, and has been in the habit of receiving from England a sauce somewhat similar to that of the plaintiff,
which is called the "Improved Worcestershire Sauce," prepared
by Richard Millar & Co., of London. The defendant is their
agent for the sale of this latter sauce in this part of the country.
I think the proof establishes that there has long been known in the
market a certain kind of sauce used for the table, on fish and meats
of various kinds, as "Worcestershire Sauce"; that it is a sort of
generic term given to this kind of sauce from the fact that it was
originally manufactured in Worcestershire, England. It seems
to have been manufactured also in other places, and the term
"Worcestershire Sauce" seems to have been applied to that species
of sauce. Under the circumstances, therefore, it can hardly be
claimed that the plaintiffs, simply because they reside in Worcestershire, and manufacture a sauce which they call "Worcestershire
Sauce," have the sole right to the application of the term to that
species of sauce. I think that the proof also shows that the plaintiffs have been cognisant for many years of the fact that there was
this kind of- sauce manufactured to which the term was applied;
that for many years they took no steps to prevent the 'parties from
manufacturing the sauce; and that, therefore, there may be said to
have been something in the nature of an acquiescence in the manufacture of the sauce.
The proof also shows that the plaintiffs filed a bill in chancery
in England against the principal of the defendant, Millar, of London, on the ground that he or his company were manufacturing the
very species of sauce which is -the subject of controversy in this
case, asking for an injunction to restrain him from such manufacture, and from using the term "Worcestershire Sauce," they
claiming that they had the right to it as a trade-mark, and that no
one else without their consent could use it, and also asking for an
account from the defendant. The case was heard by the Master of
the Rolls, Sir GEORGE JESSEL, and fully considered by him in 1876,
and the injunction was refused and the bill dismissed. There was
no appeal from this decree; on the contrary, it seems to have been
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acquiesced in by the plaintiffs. I see nothing in the record tc
raise a doubt that the case was decided on its merits. I think,
therefore, that this case is a bar to the action of the plaintiffs.
They brought the suit against Millar, the principal of the defend
ant in this case, on the very subject-matter of controversy here;
they asked for an injunction for the same reasons that the injunction is asked here, and for substantially the same general relief.
It was refused by the Master of the Rolls, and the bill dismissed.
Deakin, the defendant here, has acted for Millar,. the defendant in
that case. It would be an anomaly if it were true that Millar
could manufacture and sell his sauce in England, and at the same
time Deakin, who sells it here, and obtains it from him, could be
restrained here at the instance of the plaintiffs from selling it.
By agreement between the parties, and the order of the court,
many of the questions on the admissibility of evidence were submitted to the Master, and he made his report thereon to the court,
and exceptions have been taken to his report. It is unnecessary for
me to consider these various exceptions. It is sufficient to say, I
think, there is evidence in the case which ought to be admitted, and
from which these conclusions can be deduced. The result will be,
therefore, that the bill will be dismissed.
This is the third reported civil action
brought by the complainants in reference to their alleged trade-mark, not to
mention the criminal case of State v.
Gibbs, 56 Mo. 133; and as the principal
case was bitterly and thoroughly contested, the trial consuming a week, unless the appeal which has been taken be
perfected, this will probably be the end
of litigation on this ubject. In Lea
v. Woff, the first of these cases, reported in 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 1, the
controversy being in reference to an
American brand of Worcestershire, the
Supreme Court of New York, at special
term, on motion of complainant for an
interlocutory injunction, enjoined the
use of defendant's labels, but refused to
enjoin the use by defendant of the words
"Worcestershire Sauce." At the gene.ral term, on appeal from the interlocutory order, the samo court enjoined

both the use of the labels and words in
controversy. At this point the contest
ceased, the defendants, Wolff and Reessing, making under the New York practice a proffer of judgment, which was
accepted by the complainants.
No full report of the decision of Lea
Y. Millar, the second case, has ever been
published. It is referred to in Sebastian
on Trade Marks, pages 7 and 64; and
Airton on Decrees,4th edition, page 242.
Judge DnUxxOND gives in his opinion
the essential features of the case.
The doctrine of Lea v. Wolff, would
not seem to be in conflict with either
Lea v. Millar, or the principal case for
the court says in the first-named case:
"The defendants doubtless might,
under proper circumstances, employ the
name of a place where an article is manufactured, as well as the word descriptive of its character; but such words
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must be employed honestly and properly, and not with a design to imitate
and deceive to the detriment of another.
Where names are in common use, no one
person can claim a special appropriation
of them to his particular use, but where
words and the collocation of words have
by language become known as designating the article of a particular manufacturer, he acquires a right to them as a
trade-mark, which competing dealers
cannot fraudulently invade. The essence
of the wrong tsthe false representatwn.and
deceit. When the improper de.mgn is apparent, an injunction should be issued."
From this extract and from the opinion as a whole, it is evident that the
court based its decision upon the point
that a fraudulent intent, shown by the
use of similar labels, was so clearly and
evidently manifest, that an injunction
must issue as prayed for. In the case
decided by Judge DnuxxoNw, there
was a clear distinction between complainants' and respondents' labels.
It is impossible in the little space allowed in a brief note on the case, to
mention all of the many authorities
quoted by the respective counsel, whose
briefs were elaborate and exhaustive.
So far as the decision of Judge DuuxMOND is based upon the point that po
words which have become generic in
meaning can be appropriated as a trademark, its soundness cannot be questioned. Among the many adjudicated
cases upon this point may be mentioned,
Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 323;
Thompson v. Winchester, 19 Pick. 214;
Wolff v. Goulard, 18 How. Pr. 64;
Sherwood v. Andrews, 5 Am. L. R. N.
S. 591; Candee v. Deere, 10 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 694; Singer M'fg Co. v.
Wilson, Law Rep. 2 Ch.Div. 434; Cocks
v. Chandler, Law Rep. 11 Eq. 446 ; Lazenby v. White, referred to in this last
case; Ford v. Foster, Law Rep. 7 Ch.
Appeals 611 ; and Burke v. Cassin, 45
Cal. 469.
It is quite immaterial whether the

term was generic at the time of its adoption by the claimant, or whether since
its adoption it has become generic in
meaning by constant use or otherwise.
In either event the result attained, viz.,
generic character, is the ground of defence. It will be noticed that the word
"Worcestershire" is geographical.
The general rule that the name of a
place cannot be appropriated by any one
exclusively as a trade-mark, has been
well-settled in law since the cases of
Canal Co. v. Clarke, 13 Wall. 311 ; Candee v. Deere, 10 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
694; Brooklyn White Lead Co. v.
Masury, 25 Barb. 416; Glendon Iron
Co. v. Uhler, 13 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
543; Blacwell v. WrigIt, 73 N. C.
310.
The exceptions to such rule may be
said to-be, First. When the term ceases
to be geographical in meaning and becomes a mere fancy name in reality, or
in the general estimation or view of the
public, as in case of the words "Bethesda," "Mount Carmel," etc.
Second. When the claimants qwn all
the soil of the place from whence the
article is produced, as in Newmat v. Alvord, 49 Barb. 588; Congress 4"Empire
Spring Co. v. High Rock Spring Co., 57
Barb. 526; Dunbar v. Glenr. 16 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 673.
Another class of cases exists, spoken of,
but as it would often seem erroneously, as
trade-mark cases, where a geographical
name has been so long associated with
and used for an article, that its original
geographical meaning has been reduced
to a secondary signification, when used
in connection with the article sought
to be protected, and in general estimation has become merged into the name
of the article, as in the famous Glenfield Patent Starch Case, Witherspoon v.
Currie, L. R. 5 E. & I. Appeals 508.
So in McAndrews v. Bassett, 10 Jur.
N. S. 550; Sixo v. Provizende, L. R.
1 Ch. 192; Radder. Norman, L. R. 14
Eq. 348; Lea v. Woff, 15 Abb. Pr. X.
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S. 1; and see Blacktoel v. Dibrdl, 17
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 673.
In all of these last-mentioned cases,
it will be noticed that the judges seem
to comment severely upon and base
their decision on the fraud and deception actually committed, or attempted
by the infringers, or their palpable intentions to thus deceive and defraud.
. In a technical trade-mark case, since
the right of protection is founded on
the sole right of application to, or the
right of property in a trade-mark, only
a liability to deception need be proven.
A technical trade-mark is the sole right
of application against the whole world,
which of course cannot exist in most of
the cases last cited, many of which properly come under the head of unfair
competition in business. The vital point
in such cases is to determine whether or
not the claimed trade-mark, when applied to the article in question, is conuidered in public common parlance as a
fancy name, or still when so applied,
partakes of its original geographical
meaning. In the first instance it is a
trade-mark case; in the second, a case
of unfair competition in business if anything.
In some instances, a.very strong presumption of fraud may be made merely
by proof of the use by a defendant of an
alleged trade-mark, where the defendant
does not live in the place, but the plaintiff does, the name of which place is
claimed as a trade-mark.
Even where the article of the original claimant has acquired a considerable reputation under such name, such
presumption, however, may be rebutted
in various ways. In the principal case
it was met by proof of the generic meaning of the words in dispute. Other defences would arise under various circumstances. No general rule can be
laid down upon the subject.
Perhaps, howeverthe greatest interest
in the view of the legal profession, attaching to Judge DnutmxoND's decision,

will be found in the fact that this is
believed to be the first reported trademark case in either Great Britain or the
United States in which the doctrine of
res judicata has been applied, where the
decree offered in bar was entered by a
foreign court. The leading cases holding that the decree on judgment of a
foreign tribunal is conclusive are: Hopkins v. Lea, 6 Wheat. *113, *114;
Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 101;
Durant v. Essex*Co., 7 Wall. 107;
Baker v. Palmer, 83 IlI. 568. The
general principles of such cases are too
well known to need citation.
It was most strenuously contended by
the complainants' counsel, that the decree of a foreign court would not be
conclusive, because the jurisdiction of
the court in trade-mark cases, rested not
alone upon the right of property in a
trade-mark, but also on the ground of
fraud upon the public, and that the
American courts had the sole jurisdiction of fraud committed upon the Ameriean public, and sole jurisdiction over
all property within their jurisdiction, in
this case the property of complainants
in their trade-mark in this country.
Judge DRumaoND seems, however,
to have followed the doctrine laid down
Cloth
by, Lord WESTBURY in Lea
Co.'s Case, 33 L. J. Ch. 199, insisted
upon by defendant's counsel as now
well recognised, that the jurisdiction of
courts, in trade-mark cases, is founded
solely on the right of property in a trademark, or exclusive right of application.
See Adams on Trade-Marks 13, 75;
Ludlow & Jenkins on Trade-Marks 3,
5, 35; Sebastian on Trade-Marks,
104, 105; Brown on Trade-Marks,
R 30, 46, 112, 311, 450, 678; Singer
Afanf. Co. v. WHIson, on appeal to the
House of Lords, L. B. 3 App. Cases 376.
And also the view that the subject-matter of controversy was a right of protection, not property, strictly, such as personal or real property, having its situs
-inthe United States, and therefore solely
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subject to the sovereign power and jurisdiction of the United States also.
The principal case was commenced
in April 1875; Lea v. Millar, in the
fall of that year, and decided in July
1876. The decision of Judge DRUMSOND thus holds that even though the
suit, in which the decree is rendered,
was commenced at a later date than the
suit in which it was pleaded or offered in
evidence, still the bar of such decree
is complete, following the doctrine of,
among other cases, United &ales v.
Dewey, 6 Bissell; Sheldon v. Patterson,
55 111 512.
The principal case is interesting
also, as involving necessarily the principle : 1st. That because a name has
not been used in the United States
for any article by any one prior to its
claimed adoption in the United States
by a claimant, it cannot be a trademark, provided it has been in common
use for similar articles to those in question outside of the United States. This
point was passed upon in Burke v. Cassin, 45 Cal. 479. 2d. That if a claimed
trade-mark for an article cannot be
maintained in the country where the
article is made, it cannot be elsewhere,
because the alleged trade-mark does not
denote in the place where the article is

manufactured, that it is made by the
claimant, and that elsewhere the alleged
trade-mark could merely denote that the
article was made where manufactured.
This last proposition may involve a
conflict of law where the trade-mark
laws of two countries differ. The nearest approach to a reported decision upon
this point is noticed in the Solicitors'
Journal of July 25th 1876, vol. 2, p.
765, where the Master of the Rolls
clearly maintained this last proposition
as correct, although deciding the case
upon another point. That both of these
two propositions are correct, will appear when it is remembered, as alike
maintained in Burke v. Cassin, supra,
and by the Master of the Rolls, that if
such principles be not maintained, the
argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, enabled one of two manufacturers in the United States to steal the
trade-mark of the other in a foreign
country by prior use in such foreign
country, creating for his articla a reputation and name under such stolen trademark, and by such prior use in a foreign
country prevent the real owner from
ever using such trade-mark in such foreign country.
CHALES E. PoPR.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.
GEORGE R. HODGDON v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN
RAILROAD CO,

ANtD

HARTFORD

In the absence of any special custom, the contract of a shipmaster to carry a
cargo to a certain port, means that he is to bring his vessel to some wharf or convenient and usual place of discharge, where he can deliver and the consignee
receive the cargo.
The master of a vessel arrived in the port of New Rfaven, but could not reach
any wharf for some days, on account of the ice. Held, that he was not entitled
to demurrage, as he had not completed his voyage until he reached the wharf.
The fact, that the consignees, during the time the vessel lay in harbor, employed
tugs to break a passage through the ice, and bring other vessels to their wharf,
did not entitle this master to demand the same help towards the discharge of his
cargo.
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ASSUMPSIT for demurrage.

On December 14th 1876, the plaintiff received on board of a
vessel at Baltimore, a cargo of coal consigned to the defendants, at
New Haven, at which port he reported himself on the 24th of
December, and asked for a berth in which to discharge; but he did
not come to any dock, for the reason that the ice was so thick that
he could reach no 'wharf in the harbor, unless through openings
made by steam-tugs or otherwise, before the 19th of January 1877.
Between these dates, the defendants daily broke a passage, through
which they towed vessels to and from their own docks. On the
day of the plaintiff's arrival, they opened a passage and towed
through it vessels loaded with coal consigned to themselves, which
had arrived prior to that day; and, when his turn came, they opened
a passage for and towed his vessel to their dock. The ice delayed
him four days, and for this he demanded damages. The defendants
had a judgment.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARDEE, J.-Passing the question made as to the power of the
person signing the bill of lading, and assuming for the purposes of
the case that the defendants were bound by his act, still the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment. He undertook to deliver the
coal at the port of New Haven; and twenty-four hours after his
arrival at that port and notice thereof to the defendants, they were
to have, for the reception of the cargo, one day for every hundred
tons thereof; after which they were to pay demurrage.
Upon notice to the defendants of the arrival of the plaintiff's
vessel at New Haven, it was their duty to be ready to receive- the
coal or designate some wharf or other proper place where it could
be deposited in a reasonable time. They failing in this duty, it
was the right of the plaintiff to treat the contract as breken, and
deposit the coal at the usual place, if there was any such, or procure one at their expense. The contract to deliver at the port of
New Haven implies more than bringing the vessel into water
within a line drawn across the mouth of the harbor; in the absence
of any special provision, and of any custom to discharge into
lighters, it imports that the carrier is to bring his vessel to some
wharf or convenient or customary place of discharge where he can
deliver and the consignees can receive the cargo, according to the
usage of the port. In the case before us the plaintiff was barred by
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the frost from every wharf or landing-place which the defendants
could designate or he could select; he could not deliver the coal
upon land; the contract did not oblige them to go upon the ice to
receive it; in fact, his progress was arrested before he had brought
his voyage to the contract termination, and that by no fault of
theirs; it was a misfortune which the law must leave where it falls.
As the defendants did not contract to protect the plaintiff against
the action of frost, they owed him no duty in respect to it. If for
any reason they chose to open a way for the passage of another
vessel, the contract relation between themselves and the plaintiff
was not thereby changed; he acquired no right to the way thus
made; such other vessel having gained prior access to and occupied it, as a matter of law it did not exist so far as the plaintiff is
concerned.
In Parker v. Winlow, 7 E. & B. 940, the tides were neap when
the vessel approached the designated wharf, and she ran upon the
sand and lay there during some days until the tides were higher.
Lord CAMPBELL, C. J., said: "If when the ship got fixed upon
the mud bank the master had given notice that he was ready to
discharge there, it might have been open to him to show that it was
the duty of the other party to take the cargo there, and, if he could
have shown such to be their duty, the lay days would have commenced. But no such notice was given; there was no suggestion
of any custom requiring the consignees to procure lighters; and
both sides acted as if they did not contemplate any unloading until
the vessel got up to the wharf." In McIntosh v. Sinclair, 11
Irish Rep., Com. Law Series 456, PALLES, C. B., said: "The
obligation of the shipowner under the charter-party is not alone to
carry the cargo to the port of destination, but in addition, to deliver
it according to the usage of the port. This duty is not discharged
simply by arrival at the port or at the usual place of discharge
within the port."
In Aylward .v. Smith, 2 Lowell's Decisions 192 (Dist. Court of
Mass., affirmed by the Circuit Court), the libellants' vessel came to
the respondent's wharf, on the 20th of December, at high tide, and
was made fast outside of another vessel, which was in the berth. This
last was hauled out on the next day; but the libellant's vessel was
then aground, and so remained; afterwards the ice made round her,
and she could not be hauled in for several days. LOWELL, J., said:
"The plaintiff says that he arrived at the wharf on the 20th of

